A number of papers over the last decade have posited that Optimal Currency Areas are endogenous with respect to business cycle synchronization. The claim is that a common currency will greatly increase trade, and then trade will increase output synchronization. Countries that thus seem illsuited for a common currency prior to a monetary union may become well-suited once the union is in place. There are other channels, however, through which a common currency could lead to convergent-or divergent-business cycles that this literature overlooks. We thus test directly for the impact of the Euro on business cycle synchronization using two variants of Markov Switching models. Examining four small Euro zone countries, our results indicate there was no increase in convergence with the larger economies of Germany and France in two cases, and in the other two cases, actually divergence. In contrast, when investigating three non-Euro zone countries, there is no significant loss of synchronization in two cases, and an increase in synchronization in one case. These results are precisely the opposite of what would be expected from the endogenous OCA literature, and bolster the case for caution before nations with differing cycles or structures enter a currency union.
Introduction
Preceding its beginning in 1999, the Euro zone has attracted skeptics who worried that a single monetary policy would be problematic for such a varied group of nations. For instance, in the Euro's early years there were "peripheral" nations such as Ireland and Spain, which grew fast, and experienced some asset and housing bubbles (which of course later burst), and would presumably have benefitted from tighter monetary policy over 1999-2006. In contrast, wealthier "center" nations such as France and Germany experienced very sluggish growth in the initial years of the currency and may well have benefitted from looser money and lower interest rates than the ECB provided. More recently, of course, many peripheral countries face major adjustment problems, with burst housing bubbles, large government and private sector indebtedness and very high unemployment, and loose monetary policy at the moment would be the standard prescription. Yet at the same time, the ECB has been criticized for being too tight in the face of the current global downturn (Angela Merkel, Germany's prime minister, has expressed a desire that the ECB run an even tighter policy, and two ECB officials from Germany-Juergen Stark and Axel Weber-have resigned in apparent protest of central bank attempts to alleviate the debt crisis by buying sovereign bonds). The Euro zone, in short, may not have been an Optimal Currency Area (OCA).
Traditional criteria for joining a currency union include factor mobility between the prospective currency union members (see Mundell, 1961) , as well as the extent of trade. Later economists added such standards as a system of risk sharing through fiscal policy, and, especially for the purposes of a "one-sizefits-all" monetary policy, highly synchronized business cycles (see . The lack of synchronized business cycles between the center and peripheral countries of the Euro zone may be the most important reason for doubts that the now seventeen member union is truly an OCA.
On the other hand, a growing academic literature over the last decade (see Rose, 2008 for a summary and meta-analysis) has produced results indicating that, even if a currency union such as the Euro-zone isn't an optimal currency area prior to nations joining it, the very act of creating and joining the common currency makes the union an OCA ex-post. There are two mechanisms at work. First, joining a common currency will increase trade-the initial estimates of Rose suggest a huge effect; currency unions appeared to triple trade. Secondly, the increase in trade will increase business cycle synchronization among the different nations in the currency union. If these two mechanisms work, then even if different countries seem ill-suited for currency union ex-ante, they will, upon joining the union, experience more synchronized business cycles, making one currency (and one central bank and monetary policy) optimal. In this way, an OCA is endogenous.
While the results of Rose and others are provocative, there are a number of empirical problems with their methodology. First, the methods for estimating the effects of currency unions on trade, and trade on synchronization have been subject to much criticism. Secondly, Rose (2008) , in his metaanalysis, combines estimates of the impact of currency unions on trade with estimates of the effect of trade on business cycle synchronization to get an estimate of the total impact of joining an OCA on synchronization. This technique assumes that trade is the only channel through which a currency union affects synchronization. To cite one counter-example, if a currency union increases capital flows, it could send investment from stagnant, center countries to peripheral nations, helping to fuel bubbles in the latter, thus leading to less synchronization. There could be several important ways in which a common currency could affect business cycle synchronization. The goal of this paper is not to list or develop models on all such channels. Rather, we will employ a technique which will directly estimate the impact of "center" output on "peripheral" business cycles.
The purpose of this paper is to use the nonlinear Markov Switching (MS) technique to check if four peripheral Euro zone nations have become more synchronized with the center nations in their output growth. 1 We will then, as a further check, examine whether three smaller European countries, which have chosen not to adopt the Euro, have experienced a decrease in business cycle synchronization with the center of Euro zone as a result of retaining their own currencies. Both the time-varying transitional probability (TVTP) and the traditional fixed transitional probability (FTP) MS models will be used to examine the output dynamics of these small economies. The TVTP model assumes that certain economic variables, such as the center nations' output growth, affect the transitional probability. In contrast, the FTP model assumes that the transitional probabilities are exogenous and hence the probabilities are not modeled as functions of economic variables. In an FTP model, the unobserved state variable, dictated by constant probabilities, determines the state of the economy, i.e., being in an expansion or recession.
Based on the FTP estimation results, we are able to derive the probability of the economy being in recession or expansion. Instead of incorporating variables such as the center nations' output growth directly into the original FTP equation, we use a probit model to investigate the impacts of the center nations' output growth on the peripheral nation's probability of being in a recession. 2 Though these TVTP and FTP models are different, they provide a consistent insight about this topic.
Our results cast serious doubt on hopes that the smaller nations of the Euro-zone have made progress toward being part of a European OCA by the mere act of joining. Results differ slightly among particular countries between the two different Markov Switching models employed, but are consistent in two respects. First, for both MS models, in two of the four smaller Euro-zone economies, there is no significant increase in synchronization since adopting the Euro. More importantly, for the other two Euro zone nations, there has been a significant decrease in synchronization with the large European economies since entering the Euro-zone.
Secondly, for the three non-Euro zone nations, in two cases there was no significant change in synchronization with the larger economies of Europe. For the third nation -Sweden in the TVTP MS 2 As will be shown later, we use five explanatory variables in the probit model. Should the five variables be included in the original FTP model, it creates difficulty in obtaining convergent estimates for some countries. In some cases, even if the convergence is achieved, the Hessian matrix fails to be positive definite at the point of supposed convergence, probably due to overflow and/or underflow problems and the ensuing numerical inaccuracies. To circumvent this barrier, we use FTP/probit approach. In our FTP/probit setting, we assume that variables such as center nations' output growth rates are contained in the error term. Since the error term drives the economy to be in recession or in expansion, we then examine how the second stage variables, such as the center nations' output growth rates, affect these phenomena.
specification and Denmark in the FTP -there has been a significant increase in synchronization with central Europe since refusing to join the Euro zone. Thus in these cases failure to adopt the Euro has not been sufficient to reverse integration with the main economies of the continent, while for two Euro zone countries joining the Euro has failed to prevent a divergence in cyclical fluctuations with its currency partners.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section details the literature on OCAs and their possible endogeneity. The third section discusses the methodology, and the fourth presents our results. The fifth section concludes.
Previous Literature
The classic work on OCA goes back to Mundell (1961) with contributions by among others, McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) . The early literature emphasized the importance of factor mobility and the level of trade as criteria for whether a group of countries should form a currency union. Later work added a system of fiscal transfers and the similarity of shocks and business cycles as conditions for a common currency to be truly "optimal". These last two metrics could be vital-once a currency union (CU) is in place, there is only one monetary policy. Thus it could be problematic if potential members of a CU exhibited asymmetric responses to shocks and little output co-movement.
Given the different sizes and structures of the varied Euro-zone economies, business cycle synchronization was a major concern prior to the Euro's existence. However, a criticism of business cycle synchronization, as well as other criteria for OCAs, is that they are potentially endogenous. For instance, it may well be the case that the extent of trade between countries will be different before and after adoption of a CU. Starting in 1996, a series of papers beginning with Frankel and Rose (1996) presented results indicating that joining a CU greatly increases trade. Indeed, the initial estimates of the impact of a common currency on trade suggested a CU would triple trade between nations sharing the same money. Moreover, even if CUs were to increase trade and greater trade in itself raises BCS, the effect of greater trade on BCS may be swamped by other factors. For instance, if joining the common currency leads to a sharp increase in foreign borrowing (see Eichengreen and Hausman, 1999, pp. 91-92 for a discussion on exchange rate rigidity and foreign borrowing), then capital may flow from relatively stagnant "center" countries to faster growing "peripheral" nations with higher returns, fueling growth (and perhaps bubbles) in the peripheral nations. This process, which would describe the experience of several smaller Euro-zone countries in the early years of the currency, would tend to lower, rather than raise BCS (especially when the housing and asset bubbles in the periphery burst, and capital flows quickly reversed).
Indeed, Alesina, Barro and Tenreyo (2002) find that CUs do raise trade, but do not, in most specifications, have a significant impact on output co-movement. Using a panel approach, and attempting to directly address the issue of endogeneity between trade and common currencies, Barro and Tenreyo (2007) find that trade is enhanced by CUs, while the co-movement of output shocks actually decreases in response to sharing the same currency. Along these lines, Buscher and Gabrisch (2011) find that the Euro has had little impact in synchronizing nominal wage dynamics in the Euro zone, as asymmetries in nominal wage formation continue to persist across the continent's common currency area.
Another way in which a CU could decrease, rather than increase BCS is through different inflation rates in member countries. A further difficulty of interpretation with the Frankel and Rose results is that most studies of CU and BCS measure BCS as a correlation coefficient "that is estimated between detrended levels of activity for countries i and j" (Rose, 2008, p. 6) . Even assuming the detrending techniques-such as HodrickPrescott or Baxter-King decompositions-are reliable, they yield one estimate for an entire cross-country sample. These are of course subject to the same criticisms of cross-country studies on other topics (see Eichengreen, 2001) , and even if their average estimate is an unbiased statistic for the average effect, individual country experience may differ substantially from the average 3 .
Despite the difficulties of interpretation, Rose (2008) European nations. They find that the growth in the correlation of output was greater for European countries outside the Euro zone than for those within the currency union! This result is robust to measuring output shocks as deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott trend. There may of course be questions 3 On a related note, Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) point out that if a CU is between a large (anchor) and small (client) nations, "What turns out to matter is not the correlation of shocks, per se, but rather the variance of the client country's output expressed as a ratio to the anchor country's output. This variance depends partly on the correlation of output (and, hence, of underlying shocks) and partly on the individual variances of outputs. For example, a small country's output may be highly correlated with that in the United States. But, if the small country's variance of output is much greater than that of the United States, then the U.S. monetary policy will still be inappropriate for the client. In particular, the magnitude of countercyclical monetary policy chosen by the United States will be too small from the client's perspective." (pp. 7-8).
of interpretation with using output correlations to measure BCS, as noted by Alesina, Barro and Tenreyo (2002) Given all of the problems with the cross country methods, and the very interesting findings of Willett, et al., we thus propose a different method for examining directly whether the Euro has led to greater BCS in peripheral countries. Unlike cross-country studies which estimate one effect for all nations, our method allows a different impact of the Euro on the synchronization of different smaller nations with the larger economies of the Euro-zone.
Data and Methodology
Our goal is to determine how much, if at all, the Euro has increased BCS between the larger and We take the log difference as our output growth measure. We define the center and the periphery as follows: the center countries are Germany and France. The peripheral Euro-zone countries are Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 4 The peripheral non-EMU countries that we will examine for comparison are Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden.
4 Even though most people are interested in the so-called "PIIGS", Italy is not included in this study due to the large size of its economy.
For our first exercise, we run simple linear regressions of peripheral country output growth with the following specification: The idea behind this test is that, if a given series is indeed linear, the residuals from the linear model should be i.i.d. That is, the probability that the distance between any two residuals is less than a given constant (denoted as epsilon) should be the same for all residuals. The rejection of the null implies that the series may be non-linear. We performed this test, using epsilons of 0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2 standard deviations of each data set; we find that the null hypothesis of the data being iid is rejected for Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Switzerland, and Sweden. For Greece, if the epsilons are 1.5 and 2 standard deviations of the data set, the null is rejected. For Ireland, the null cannot be rejected. When considering the BDS result for Ireland, it is important to keep in mind that this particular test has been shown to lack good finite sample properties (see Enders, 2010, p. 437) .
Given the results of the nonlinearity tests, the exercise in simple regressions will yield evidence that is at best suggestive, as we are merely looking at linear estimates of the business cycle, which is an inherently nonlinear process. To gather evidence in a more rigorous fashion, we will employ Markov Switching (MS) models, which since Hamilton's (1989) pioneering paper, have been utilized to investigate business cycle fluctuations.
We construct our MS model for country output by starting with an AR(p) model, 
We will use an AR(3) model to demonstrate the equality of the following equations. For p > 3, the procedure is the same. Note that the equation = 0 + 1 −1 + 2 −2 + 3 −3 + is exactly the same as ∆ = 0 + (
Where φ = ρ -1. A two-state Markov process has the following transition probabilities:
Pr( = 0| −1 = 0, Φ −1 ) = � and Pr( = 1| −1 = 1, Φ −1 ) = � for the time-varying probability case; Pr( = 0| −1 = 0) = � and Pr( = 1| −1 = 1) = � for the constant probability case. 7 The parameter 1 captures the change in the mean of output growth during regime 1 relative to regime 0. If 1 is negative, regime 1 is the contraction regime while regime 0 is the expansion regime. Otherwise, regime 1 is the expansion regime and regime 0 is the contraction regime. For the variance, ( ) = ℎ 0 when = 0 and ( ) = ℎ 1 when = 1. In this paper, we will use p = 3. The author employed numerous variables to explain the Mexican business cycle, but each regressor was entered into the TVTP MS model one at a time, rather than simultaneously. Moreover, despite trying 7 Since the latter is a more general case than the former, from now on, the mention of the latter implicitly includes the former. 
where the three columns of G represent the statuses of the state variable at t-2, t-1, and t respectively. Then for l = 3, G is a 16 × 4 matrix; for l = 4, G is a 32 × 5 matrix.
each variable one at a time, the author found only one of the candidate variables showed significance in the TVTP model.
Given the difficulties in obtaining meaningful results for some countries 9 when we include all five predictor variables in the TVTP model, we will follow two approaches. First, to obtain convergent estimates of a TVTP MS model, we will drop the US variables ( , −1 and 99 , −1 y US ) and the Euro dummy (D 99 ) as we cannot obtain convergence when they are included in the model. We will then examine the impact, in the TVTP estimation, of , −1 and 99 , −1 . Our second approach will be to estimate an FTP MS model, and then to run a probit model in which the probability of being in regime 1
is estimated as a function of the five variables above, for those countries in which the two US variables appear significant.
For the TVTP model, we will thus specify the transition probabilities as follows:
Thus for the TVTP, the parameters are ( 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 2 , ℎ 0 , ℎ 1 , p0 , p1 , p2 , q0 , q1 , q2 ). For our fixed transition probability approach, we note that the parameters of the FTP model are 
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Convergence is difficult to achieve. As mentioned earlier, in some cases, convergence is achieved but the Hessian matrix fails to be positive definite. Thus, we could not obtain the standard errors of some estimates.
where A special characteristic of the FTP MS model is that we are able to calculate the probability of the economy in S t =1 for each time period. Based on these probability values, we will assess the impacts of German-French output growth on the business cycles of peripheral Euro and non-Euro members, both before and after the creation of the Euro. We will implement the following Probit model for each of the seven small nations: German-French and U.S. output growth on the probability of recession post-Euro adoption. If the theory of endogenous OCAs is correct, 3 should be negative and significant for the four smaller Euro economies. That is, since Euro adoption, an increase in German-French output should lower the probability of recession in the smaller Euro economies more than before the creation of the common currency. We also test for 0 : 2 = 3 = 0. As displayed in Table 1, at the 10% significance level, all except Ireland display a responsiveness to the Euro zone center economy. Finally, the test results of 0 : 2 = 3 = 4 = 5 = 0 are reported on the last row of Table 1 , and, as displayed, the null is rejected for all countries. Of course the results of these regressions are really nothing more than informal linear exercises, so any inference must be very tentative. We thus turn to investigating how BCS has changed since the Euro by applying the MS models. i.e., regime 1 is the contraction regime for all countries except Greece. Thus, for Greece only, regime 1 is the expansion regime. Note that θ where i=1,2,3 are related to regime 0 while θ are related to regime 1. In particular, θ 2 measures the impact of the interaction of French-German output changes and the Euro years on the probability of staying in recession for all countries except Greece (where it measures the impact of this interaction on the probability of staying in an expansion). Analogously, θ 2 measures the impact of this interaction term on the probability of staying in recovery for all countries, except for Greece (where it measures the impact on the probability of staying in a recession). None of the estimates of θ 2 is significant. For Euro zone members, the estimates of θ 2 are insignificant for Greece and Spain, which indicates no increase in BCS since joining the Euro zone. Notably, however, θ 2 is positive and significant for both Portugal and Ireland. That is, an increase in French-German output, since the Euro's introduction, raises the likelihood of a recession in these two Euro-zone nations-a result exactly the opposite of what would be expected if the OCA criteria were endogenous! Joining the Euro has apparently led to less, not more synchronization for these two smaller Euro-zone members.
Results
For the non-Euro countries, θ 2 is insignificant for Denmark and Switzerland, indicating no loss in BCS from retaining their own currencies. However, the coefficient is negative and significant for Sweden, indicating an increase in BCS with the Euro-zone's center since the Euro's introduction, despite
Sweden's failure to join the Euro zone. Thus, none of the four Euro zone nations in the sample has experienced an increase in BCS since the currency's introduction, and in two cases there has been a decrease in BCS. None of the three non-Euro zone nations has experienced a decrease in BCS since the Euro's introduction, and in one case there has been an increase in BCS. These results are precisely the opposite of those predicted by the endogenous OCA literature.
Even with these results, we want to test whether the TVTP model is preferred relative to the FTP specification. In the last row of Table 2 , we impose the restriction of p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 =0. This is the restriction that transitional probabilities are not affected by any economic variables. By using the likelihood values of both the unrestricted and restricted cases, 11 the likelihood ratio test of 0 : p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 =0 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all countries, except Greece and Switzerland. Thus, compared to the FTP, TVTP is actually not a clearly preferred model for Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Denmark and Sweden. The failure to demonstrate the significant impact of these variables on the transitional probabilities in these countries does not, of course necessarily imply that these variables are irrelevant in these small economy's business cycles. Thus, for a more robust investigation, we will now turn to the FTP model. In the case of TVTP, since the transitional probabilities depend on the lagged values of other economic variables, the calculation of the likelihood value of the model starts from the 4 th observation (see Kim and Nelson 1999, p.93, Program 5) . This differs from the FTP model where the calculation of the likelihood value could start earlier. Thus, the likelihood value of the FTP model is different from that of the TVTP model, even when p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 =0. Though it seems to be a programming issue, it actually becomes important in implementing the likelihood ratio test in the choice of TVTP versus FTP. A correct test of p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 =0 should use the same program with the same number of observations. In regard to the dynamics of output variability, the estimates of ℎ 0 and ℎ 1 indicate the volatility in regimes 0 and 1, respectively. 13 With the exception of Denmark and Sweden, both estimates are statistically significant. For all countries, the estimate of ℎ 1 is greater than that of ℎ 0 . Thus, for all countries except Greece, there is a substantial increase in industrial production variability as the economy moves from the expansion regime (i.e., regime 0) to the recession regime (i.e., regime 1). This accords with Mitchell's (1927) claim that downturns tend to be more volatile than expansions. The exception here is Greece. It should be noted that not all researchers have found that recessions are more volatile than recoveries in all countries. Mejia-Reyes (2000) finds that output has greater volatility in recessions for four out of eight Latin American countries surveyed (Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Peru), but in the case of Colombia, expansions are more volatile than recessions. In three cases (Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela) there appeared to be no difference in volatility across business cycle phases.
Upon obtaining the FTP results, we then estimated the probabilities in the probit model, as mentioned:
Some may suggest that we should include these five variables in the original FTP equation. Should we do that, for some countries, MLE convergence is difficult to achieve. As mentioned before, in some cases, even when the convergence is achieved, the Hessian matrix fails to be positive definite at the point of supposed convergence; and standard errors of some estimates could not be obtained. In the current FTP/probit model, we assume that these five variables are second stage variables, which are included in the error term. The error term drives the economy to be in a recession/ an expansion. As the FTP MLE estimates are obtained, we are able to calculate the probability of S t =1 or S t =0 (i.e., being in a recession or an expansion) for each time period 14 . Thus, instead of incorporating all these variables in the original 13 Unlike 1 α , 1 h does not measure the differences between regime 0 and 1.
14 Given 1 2 1 1 1
, we can update the probability by FTP equation, we examine the direct impacts of these five variables on the peripheral nations' probabilities of being in recession (S t =1), with Greece being the exception (state 0 is the recession state for Greece). As an illustration of the MS results, Figures 1 and 2 show the actual industrial production (IP) growth rates (the solid line) and the probability of being in recession (S t =1) (the line with "+") for
Ireland and Switzerland. The left vertical axis denotes the IP growth rate while the right vertical axis indicates the probability.
The results of the probit model are shown in Table 4 . As displayed, for Greece and Denmark the null of no US impact could not be rejected, and thus the two US variables were not included in the probit estimation. Ireland and Spain, in contrast, both appear to have become less synchronized with the United
States since the Euro's creation (estimates of 5 are negative and significant for both countries). Of course, our key parameter of interest is 3 . The estimate of 3 is insignificant for Portugal and Spain, indicating that joining the Euro has led to no change in BCS with the center for these two nations.
However, the estimate is positive and significant for Ireland, and negative and significant for Greece.
Both of these estimates indicate a decrease in BCS for Ireland and Greece. Again, the estimate of 1 is negative for Ireland, so an increase in the probability of being in regime 1 means an increase in the probability of recession; for Greece, the estimate of 1 is positive, and thus a decrease in the probability of being in this regime is a decrease in the probability of being in an expansion.
In the cases of the three non-Euro countries, the estimate of 3 is insignificant for two-Sweden and Switzerland. Thus, failing to join the Euro has not led to a loss of BCS with the center of the Euro zone. However, for the case of Denmark, the coefficient is negative and significant, so an increase in central Euro-zone output growth since the creation of the euro now has a significantly larger effect in lowering the probability of a Danish recession.
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Once again, joining the Euro has led to no increase in BCS with respect to the center for any of the four Euro zone nations, and in two cases led to a decrease in BCS. Failing to join the Euro has led to no loss of BCS, and in one case, BCS with the center of the Euro zone increased despite (or maybe even because) of retaining one's historical currency.
The results from the TVTP and FTP/Probit exercises are not identical, although they are similar.
While different Euro countries have seen a decrease in BCS depending on which method is used (Ireland and Portugal using the TVTP, Ireland and Greece with the FTP/Probit), and two different non-Euro nations have exhibited an increase in BCS (Sweden with the TVTP, Denmark with the FTP/Probit), the results are still fairly close in an important respect. For both methods, there was no case of a Euro country experiencing an increase in BCS with France and Germany, and there were two cases in which there was a significant decrease (and Ireland's decrease in BCS was significant with both estimators).
Moreover, for both methods, there was no loss of BCS for any of the three non-Euro countries. Finally, with both techniques, one non-Euro zone member experienced an increase in BCS while retaining its own currency.
As a concluding exercise for the FTP model, another way to evaluate the impact of changes on output dynamics in these economies is to inspect the changes in probability directly. Table 5 shows the effects of the central euro-zone and U.S. economies on the probability of being in regime 1 (i.e., the recession regime for all countries except Greece). Using the mean values of the independent variables as benchmarks for both before and after 1999Q1, we calculate the change in the probability P(S t =1) due to a one standard deviation difference in the German/French IP growth and/or the U.S. IP growth. The results can be classified into three groups. First, for Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, column four of French and U.S. IP growth increase the probability of being in regime 1 by 4.9% and 0.8% before 1999Q1 and decrease the probability of being in regime 1 by 9.5% and 22.1% after 1999Q1. To repeat, note that regime 1 is the contraction regime for Denmark while it is an expansion regime for Greece.
Third, for Ireland, a one standard deviation increase in both German-French and U.S. IP growth increases the probability of being in the recession regime both before and after 1999Q1 by 8% and 9%. But the decomposition in columns five and six shows that, after 1999Q1, U.S. economic expansion actually decreases Ireland's probability of being in recession by 18.2% but German/French expansion increases that probability by 27.3%.
In terms of the Euro's impact on BCS, we examine the impact of French-German growth on the probability of being in regime 1 since the currency's introduction in 1999. For the four Euro-zone countries, there is no significant impact in two cases (Portugal and Spain). There is a positive effect, significant at the five percent level for Ireland, and a negative effect, significant at the ten percent level, for Greece. Since regime 1 is the expansion state for Greece, both Ireland and Greece appear to have become less synchronized with the central Euro economies since joining the EMU.
For the three non-Euro nations, there is no significant change in the impact of German-French output since the Euro's creation in two cases (Sweden and Switzerland). There is a negative impact, 
The delta method (Greene, 2008 (Greene, :1055 (Greene, -1056 ) yields approximate errors. significant at the one percent level, on Denmark's probability of being in recession, resulting from center output growth in the post-Euro era. Thus, again, joining the Euro has led to no increase in BCS with
France and Germany for four Euro nations, and a decrease in two of these countries. In contrast, failure to join the common currency has led to no decrease in BCS for three non-Euro nations, and has been followed by an increase in BCS in one case. All of these results are again the precise opposite of what the endogenous OCA theory would predict.
Conclusion
The debate over readiness for entry into the Euro zone has been split, going back prior to the Euro's creation, between those believing that prospective members should fulfill a number of criterion prior to joining, and those who thought the very act of joining would create the conditions necessary for the common currency's benefits to exceed costs. Eichengreen (2002) provides an excellent synopsis of the debate between the two camps. He concludes that theory and evidence point to the importance of reforming prior to the adoption of a common currency, and not expecting the act of joining to produce the desired economic changes. 
